Friday, April 17, 2020

Can There Ever Be a Material Explanation of Consciousness?

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In any attempt to achieve any possibility of a materialistic explanation of consciousness, even in principle, one must take into account the singular property of consciousness, which is that:  it is the only known observable phenomenon which observes itself.  Without making that fact a prominent feature of the discussion, a necessary foundation of it, one stumbles about in the darkness.
 
Furthermore, no attempt to understand consciousness can make progress without accounting for two other indefinable, fundamental observed facts.  One of these is life, and the other is free will (volition, intent, purpose).
 
Materialism defines life as the emergent property of atoms and forces of nature.  However, there must be a principle of nature that organizes those atoms, and those forces, into the extraordinary phenomenon of life.  Is that principle, randomness?  The universe itself seems to be governed by intentional design.  Were we to leave it there, the materialist argument would be strong; but there is a further layer of fact, one that discredits random design.
 
Free will, that is, volition and intent, is so anathema to materialism (physicalism) that the two are utterly incompatible with each other.  If ever, in all the universe, there were to be even a single instance of a volitional choice being made, that single instance would completely invalidate the myth of physicalism.  
 
The materialist relegates free will to being an illusion, but what is it that is having the illusion?  Can a robot have the illusion that it is making an independent choice?  Can a living being be conscious, and yet relegate itself to the status of an algorithm?  If so, then what would be the value of life?  Of thought?  Of justice?
 
Of course all of this is subject to dispute, but in my view, there is no utility in regarding reality as merely physical, and great utility in viewing ourselves as morally accountable, spiritual beings inhabiting a physical world.
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