Tuesday, December 18, 2018

Free Will, Determinism, or Something Else?

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The question of whether we have free will, or whether we are biological robots doing only (and exactly) as nature compels us to do, presents problems which the best minds have struggled to resolve.  An article by Roy F. Baumeister at https://slate.com/technology/2013/09/free-will-debate-what-does-free-will-mean-and-how-did-it-evolve.html seeks to offer a third possibility.  Is there, in fact, a compromise position?  Or is there something that is truly a third way?
 
If we answer simply that, yes, we do have free will, then we run afoul of physics—at least the current paradigm which guides physics research.  The current theory of physics relies on something called, determinism.  A familiar way of describing determinism is to use the familiar analogy of a row of dominoes.  Tip the first domino and it knocks over the second, which knocks over the third, and so forth.  This simple chain of cause and effect exhibits the physics principle of causation, which in however complex a form, applies to everything that happens, including the choices we make.  Another way of expressing this principle is to cite the maxim that, everything in physical nature can be explained by other things in physical nature; no other explanation is needed.  Free will simply does not exist.  It cannot.
 
Therefore, if we do have free will, we must conclude that physics, in its current state, is wrong.  Stated another way, there is something more than physical cause and effect which results in physical events.  If I am confronted with the choice between turning left or turning right, the physical event of my turning is not dictated by the dominoes that have previously fallen.  It is determined by something that physics has not defined, something like a spirit or soul, something not of this physical world.
 
That conclusion is considered heresy in physics, not just heresy, but by purists, a despicable falsehood, either the delusions of fools, or the intellectual crime of superstition.
 
The irony is this:  if a person believes in free will, but if at the same time there is no free will, then that person did not choose to believe in free will.  That belief was forced upon him by preceding physical events.  Then, how can he be blamed?
 
The online article at Slate, by Roy F. Baumeister, cited above, makes a valiant attempt to resolve the issue, in a way that the author seems to hope, might be acceptable to both sides.  The effort fails.  It basically concludes that free will is actually what we only think is free will.  We think so, due only to the complexity of the mechanics of how we make decisions—but they are still mechanics, after all, not the truly independent decision of a sovereign entity.
 
The doctrine of free will does not necessarily assert that every decision we make is independent of physical causes.  On the contrary, all our decisions are at least partially influenced by physical causation, and the degree of that influence may be overwhelming in many cases.  Some of our actions are so routine that we do not bother to use our power of free will.  But, at its core, there is no compromise.  As to whether free will is possible, or not possible, that is either yes, or no. 
 
If we are to accept that we never, ever, have any power to act volitionally as independent, sovereign agents of physical causation in nature, then we must accept unavoidable absurdities.  One of them has already been mentioned, which is that our belief or disbelief that free will is possible, is not the result of our investigation of the facts, but rather, the result of an inexorable chain of physical causation. 
 
There is a greater issue—in fact, two of them.  One of them asks, are we active participants in our own lives, or merely passive observers?  The other issue asks, does physical nature just happen to give rise to living, conscious, volitional beings—or is physical nature designed around us, to be our habitat?
 
It quickly becomes apparent, then, that the question of free will is not isolated from other profound questions.  It involves the fundamental essence of natural reality.  It addresses our own reality as either biomechanical machines, or spiritual beings in physical form. Moreover, it involves the great mysteries of science, religion and philosophy.
 
If the standard model of physical causation is wrong, then that opens exciting avenues of research which are currently considered to be heretical.  If, on the other hand, we truly have no free will, then we are actors on a stage, reciting lines that nobody wrote.  We are as futile as, as Shakespeare puts it, in Macbeth 5:5, a sound and fury signifying nothing, a tale told by an idiot.
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